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LIBERTY.- RETHINKING AN IMPERILED IDEAL. By Glenn Tinder. William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company 2007. Pp. xiv, 407. $27.00. ISBN: 0-802-
80392-X.
Glenn Tinder has written an uncommonly important book. It is a
big book about big ideas. It is a book about liberty, broadly understood,
and a range of related topics. It is about faith and reason, dialogue and
community, evil and suffering, love and hope, truth and God. At
bottom, it is about the meaning of human life, both individually and in
common. This is not an easy volume, and its length and interrelated
themes are daunting. But the book rewards the patient reader with rich
and provocative insights and challenges.
Professor Tinder writes from a Christian perspective, but he
continually engages and incorporates what he calls "humanist reason" as
well. (5) According to Tinder, Christianity is an inquiring faith that
demands "universal conversation in search of the truth," (13) and he
maintains that humanist reason should embrace an equally dialogic
posture, engaging religious as well as secular thinking in a quest for
common ground. More specifically, he contends that many of his
arguments and conclusions can be supported not only by Christians and
other religious believers, but also by secular thinkers.
According to Tinder, liberty is an "imperiled ideal" because its
common justifications are inadequate, largely because they rest on
unrealistic optimism concerning human nature and human possibilities.
In reality, human nature is infected by what Christians call sin and what
Kant called "radical evil," a tendency driven by human finitude and
evidenced, all too grimly, by the historical and continuing reality of the
human experience. Liberty invites continuing sin and evil, making
liberty an ongoing "ordeal." But liberty is essential nonetheless because
it opens the only possible pathway to good, this because nothing in
human experience can be good unless it is freely chosen. According to
Tinder's "personalist" philosophy, persons are the primary reality and
the primary value. (99-106) More precisely, every person is of infinite
value and demands equal dignity, without exception. And at the heart of
personhood is human freedom. Persons are free ontologically; that is,
they are freely choosing beings by their very nature. To deny them
liberty is to deny their essential being and their human dignity. To grant
them liberty is to affirm their humanity and to permit the possibility of
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good-freely chosen good, because there is no other kind-however
likely it may be that sin and evil will prevail instead.
In reality, few use liberty wisely, but liberty permits individuals to
adopt "the liberal stance," that is, to embrace liberty despite its unhappy
consequences and to use liberty to seek and embrace the truth, a truth
that goes hand in hand with righteous action. The liberal stance is an
individual, "disencumbered" stance, one of personal conscience and
personal responsibility, but one that demands communicative, dialogic
engagement with others in the formation of community and in the search
for truth. To have value, neither community nor truth can be coerced;
they must be freely chosen. The interpersonal, communal quest for truth
therefore embodies liberty and reflects the primacy of persons, with
individuals working together and assisting others in the search.
Accordingly, communication-on serious matters implicating questions
of morality or meaning-is an expression of love and is "the primary
work of liberty." (164)
This serious dialogue-a dialogue that should be open to the claims
of faith and reason alike-occurs mainly among living persons, often
within small groups. It includes dialogue in the public realm, although
the primary purpose of politics (as distinguished from the public realm
generally) is more pragmatic: it establishes the liberal order within
which the search for truth can be conducted. However unlikely it may
seem, the search for truth extends to the entire world and to all
humanity. It thus includes communication from the past to the present
(through such means as the Bible and other texts) and on to the future.
The final goals are nothing less than universal human community and a
universal understanding and embrace of timeless, ultimate, and supreme
truth. For Christians, this truth-this light-is God.
In the flesh-and-blood world in which we live, of course, the goals
of universal community and ultimate truth are utterly unattainable, and
any movement in those directions is likely to be, at best, partial and
halting indeed. Sin and evil are too deep and too powerful. As a result,
the liberal stance is simply that, a stance; in the "ordeal of liberty," (45-
50) meaningful progress toward community and truth are quite unlikely.
Instead, we will witness ongoing sin and evil. At the same time, we will
undergo personal suffering (some more than others) and will face the
certainty of death. Even so, the liberal stance is one of genuine,
unqualified hope, both for oneself and for humanity as a whole. How is
this possible? In this world, it is not. Genuine hope requires a
transcendent perspective and an eschatological vision. "What is beyond
history," writes Tinder, "renders life within history tolerable, and it does
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this not by providing an escape from history but by giving history a final
purpose and conclusion." (363)
Ironically, personal suffering, however painful, can trigger hope by
revealing the desolation of the world. It can lead to a hunger for real
relationships and for truth-seeking communication even as it turns one's
eyes to the transcendent, to the mystery of being. To embrace hope for
oneself is to understand that one's personal future is not mere fate, but a
realization of destiny, and that one's ultimate destiny is to receive and
impart the truth. To embrace hope for humanity is to envision the end of
history, complete with universal truth and therefore universal
righteousness. For Christians, these individual and global dimensions of
hope are based on the redeeming power of Christ and on the Biblical
promises of eternal life and of Christ's Second Coming. Without hope,
including eternal hope, one must live in despair. But with hope, one can
thrive in freedom.
As the foregoing summary suggests, Professor Tinder focuses
mainly on "the spirit of liberty," as opposed to its letter. Even so, he
also discusses the need for legally enforced limits on liberty, explaining
how such limits can be defended in a manner that respects human
dignity and personal freedom to the fullest extent practicable. More
generally, the breadth of the book is striking. Throughout, Tinder
confronts an array of secular and religious thinkers, including, among
many others, Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Kant, Mill, Paul, Augustine,
Aquinas, Barth, and Buber. In so doing, Tinder models the dialogic
posture that he advocates. Non-dogmatic Christians are likely to find
Tinder's posture attractive and his book enlightening. Perhaps more
interesting, Tinder conspicuously invites non-Christians and
nonbelievers to take his arguments seriously.
As Tinder suggests, some of his arguments might well appeal to
secular thinkers. For example, some might accept the reality of radical
evil and the importance of Socratic dialogue in an ongoing search for
truth. In important respects, however, Tinder's book is a challenge to
secular thinkers. He dismisses common secular arguments for liberty as
impoverished and unpersuasive. He argues, for example, that social
contract arguments strip liberty of its moral significance and implicitly
rest on an inflated view of human nature. Likewise, he rejects utilitarian
arguments concerning appropriate limits on liberty, including the
arguments of Mill. Utilitarianism is flawed because human dignity
demands that persons never be treated merely as means, no matter the
gain to others. Contrary to Mill, moreover, harm to oneself is the
concern of all, and harm to others, without more, does not justify
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coercion, because coercion must be in service of liberty itself. These
arguments warrant serious attention and serious responses.
More fundamentally, Tinder's overall thesis rests on premises that
cannot easily be explained in secular terms. Two are basic. First,
Tinder's personalist defense of liberty rests on the infinite value of every
person and on the human dignity of each, without exception. Christians
readily can accept this view. Indeed, as Tinder maintains, "Christianity
is radically personalist" (105) because it is rooted in the incarnation of
Christ. Personalism likewise can and does appeal to other religious
believers, at least those who accept the idea of God as a divine creator,
one who created every person in the image of God. As Tinder suggests,
secular thinkers often accept the idea of equal human dignity, and,
indeed, the proposition "[t]hat every person without exception must be
respected is probably the central principle of Western morality." (118)
Yet this principle might collapse without express or implicit religious
support, because it is not clear that secular reason, standing alone, can
defend or justify the idea of human dignity for all. "Almost without
exception," writes Tinder, "[humanists] deny God and affirm personal
dignity. Does this make sense? No question before us at the outset of
the third millennium is more urgent than this one." (119)
Second, Tinder's vision of transcendent, eschatological hope,
which is essential to his overall argument, is inescapably religious. To
be sure, as Tinder explains, transcendence is not confined to Christianity
or theism, and traces of eschatology can be found elsewhere-for
example, in the life and death of Socrates, in Kant's "kingdom of ends,"
and in the Enlightenment's "idea of progress." But the ordeal of liberty
demands that the end of history be meaningful, not accidental, and-
given "the extremity of the human plight" (368)-it is doubtful that
secular thinking is up to the task. There must be eternal hope, which
realistically can be grounded only upon an anticipated "intervention
from without," something that is "God's doing rather than man's." (368)
For Christians, this means that "[h]istory leads toward and into eternal
life." (368) Secular thinkers might find glimmers of eternal hope in
temporal realities-in things of beauty, for instance, or in acts of virtue
or love. But can they fully embrace the liberal stance, living fearless
lives of freedom? Conversely, if secular thinkers have "a clear mind,
but no hope for anything beyond the world and history," is Tinder right
to suggest that they "must live in despair"? (389) These, too, are urgent
questions, questions that secular thinkers would do well to confront and
address.
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There is a risk that Tinder's central claims-including his
provocative appeals to secular thinkers-may be lost in the book's many
pages. More generally, this work may not be widely read because of its
length and complexity. An important strength of the book-its broad
scope, including its engagement with a wide range of secular and
religious thinking-might also be its primary weakness. The volume is
clearly written, but its nearly four hundred pages of text (the book
contains no footnotes) are packed full of abstract and challenging ideas.
And the book's interconnections give rise to some repetition, with the
author presenting the same or similar arguments in the course of
discussing distinct but related concepts.
Whatever its weaknesses, this book deserves to be read and
studied, not only by Christians and other religious believers, but also by
nonbelievers. Just as his argument demands, Professor Tinder asks all
persons, religious and nonreligious alike, to join him in a dialogic search
for truth. He awaits our response-with low expectations for human
progress, but with eternal hope.
Daniel 0. Conkle*
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Scholar, and Adjunct Professor
of Religious Studies, Indiana University Bloomington.
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